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Abstract. Under neoliberalism, the political relevance of citizens has been eroded according to a 
managerial conception of the state and society. As Jacques Rancière mentions, this is a condition of the 
current “post-political” time. In this context, UBI has appeared as a means to regain the political 
signification of individual attending to their material necessities and looking forward to avoiding an 
increasing level of precarity. However, UBI poses some processual and intrinsic problematizations 
affecting its emancipatory character resulting in exclusionary social, economic and political attitudes. 
Thus, this article will analyze the role of UBI in recovering the categories of citizen and democracy and 
the main problems its implementation would face. This research wants to show that, paradoxically, UBI 
can provide a substantial improvement for those social groups in risk of exclusion such as immigrants, 
women or precarious workers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
When elaborating a comprehensive definition and characterization of neoliberalism, it is 
necessary to consider multiple overlapping layers and divergent research standpoints.  
 
First, there is the problem of the geographical disparity in which neoliberal policies are 
implemented. Since the 1980s, neoliberalism can be understood as a relatively unitarian 
political and economic doctrine, has developed in different guises throughout developed and 
developing countries. Briefly, such policies were characterized by the economization of all 
areas of life, the privatization of public services or the establishment of an institutional 
framework according to the economic principle of competence (Harvey, 2007: 6). Furthermore, 
such division between developed and developing countries is far from being a static one, as, 
even inside these two parts, neoliberalism presented divergent forms, economic policies and 
political causes and effects. This is the case, for example, of Central and Southern American 
countries. However, due to the global spill-over effects of nationally localized crises, the 
measures taken to palliate them in these countries can be related to a unitarian doctrine set by 
a number of international institutions –International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) 
–and the influence that Western countries such as Great Britain and the US had in them2 
(Harvey, 2007: 103). 
 
Second, there is the issue of the historical development of neoliberalism. It is true that 
genuine neoliberal policies started to be implemented from the 1980s onwards according to the 
British and North American leadership and the influence they had in the reconceptualization 
of international institutions. Nevertheless, the gestation of neoliberal ideas and institutions had 
already been present since the end of the 19th century in what Quinn Slobodian has called the 
“Geneve School”, which was under the intellectual leadership of economists and intellectuals 
such as Ludwig von Mises, Wilhem Röpke or Friedrich Hayek. Prior to the best known Chicago 
or Virginia Schools and even before the Colloque Walter Lippman in 1938 in which the term 
neoliberal was conceived (Slobodian, 2020), these intellectuals started to shape a 
reconceptualization of a new globalized world beneficial for the free movement of capital after 
 
2 Even neoliberalism developed in different forms inside developing countries. A typical example is how 
neoliberal policies developed in countries with a more liberal tradition such as US and Great Britain, where the 
implementation was quicker (Hopkin, 2020); and how they did in countries with a more social democrat tradition 
such as Scandinavian countries, where the resistance to these policies maintained a large part of the social security 
system (Harvey, 2007: 123; 126) 
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the First World War and the development and constitution of global and international 
institutions that maintained an equilibrium between divergent political interests.  
 
Nonetheless, an alternative to these lines of inquiry has tried to define the specificity of 
neoliberalism beyond the most common historical and political economic assessments. 
Influenced by the studies of Michel Foucault on the technologies of governmentality, processes 
of subjectivation and neoliberalism, scholars such as Wendy Brown or Mitchell Dean have 
tried to update the research foundations and standpoints of the French philosopher as well as 
solve those uncovered aspects not addressed by him. According to this standpoint, 
neoliberalism should be understood as a political rationality, a form of government “aiming to 
shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991: 2), rather than 
as a set of political and economic policies.  
 
The specific feature of such technology of government has spread a market-oriented  
conception of the human being, society and the state, which has resulted in the erosion of the 
principles and foundations of democracy, citizenship and welfare institutions created 
throughout the second half of the 20th century. Under such a view, democracy and its political 
character have been translated to managerial terms, a context in which every governmental 
action and its objects are treated in profitable terms for the sake of economic growth. Thus, 
politics and the economy have been conjoined in terms of the second. As a consequence, as 
Guy Standing indicates (Standing, 2016), the category of “denizen” –those that are not able to 
enjoy one or more basic rights– represents an increasing reality for immigrants, precarious 
workers or women, which are the most injured groups inside global neoliberalism. 
 
Nevertheless, recently the Universal Basic Income (UBI) has appeared as a partial 
solution for the mentioned problems in the public and political debates. Through a monthly, 
non-conditional, in cash payment, this policy intends to provide a real basis for increasing the 
material freedom of individuals as well as increase the possibility of recovering the civic 
component of democracy. However, the process for implementing such a measure faces a 
number of obstacles and inconveniences at political and social levels. Thus, the task of this 
article is to recognize which those issues and challenges are and see how they relate with 
neoliberalism as a political rationality and the form of politics they enforce, the so-called by 
Jacques Rancière post-politics. 
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To do so, the research question will be posed as follows: how could UBI contribute to 
the restoration of democracy and the form of politics characteristic of it? The answer and main 
hypothesis of the article is that UBI is situated between emancipatory and conservative 
positions inside democracy in which, using Jacques Rancière terminology, UBI could be both 
understood as a tool that supports the strong role of the state government inside democracy; or 
as emancipatory mean for achieving a democratic form of life. The strong conclusion will be 
that UBI can be a determinant mean for ending up the precarious situation of a large segment 
of national populations. However, it is also necessary to acknowledge and understand the 
difficulties that its implementation implies, not only throughout the process of its discussion 
and bargaining between divergent parties, but also the medium and long-termed ones. 
 
Mentioned this, the structure of the article will be as follows. First, the research will 
deepen into what it means to characterize neoliberalism as a political rationality in the terms 
that Foucault and Brown do. At the same time, this chapter will focus on the explanation of 
democracy given by Jacques Rancière from which it will be possible to envision how it is 
affected by the political rationality of neoliberalism. Secondly, the research will continue by 
pointing out the contributions that UBI delivers for palliating the negative consequences of 
neoliberalism. In this sense, the chapter will explore the republican literature on the UBI for 
providing how this proposal could aid to recover the category of citizenship inside a 
democracy. However, the research will also emphasize the divergent issues coming from the 
UBI implementation at political and social levels. On the one hand, it will be stressed the 
difficulty to reach a comprehensive consensus on the UBI and its strategic instrumentalization. 
On the other hand, the chapter will question the emancipatory character of UBI attending to 
the Marxist literature on the proposal. Such a view will provide a critical note on UBI as well 
as an overview of the possible exclusionary dangers it could bring. Finally, a final conclusion 
will be provided. 
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2. NEOLIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE POST-POLITICAL MOMENT 
For Brown, the characterization of neoliberalism as political rationality needs to be 
regarded as a reformulation of the liberal governmental rationality of the 18th and 19th centuries 
(Brown, 2016: 60). Under such a view, the state set an internal limit to the “art of government” 
that would define the specificity of modern governmental reason (Foucault, 2016: 23). Briefly, 
such a specific character is defined by the separation of the spheres of economy and politics. 
Here, the expansive and comprehensive nature of the state needed to be limited under a 
reflection of the proper mechanisms of government that would not intervene in the natural 
developments of the market. Thus, the state developed the political economic rationality that 
would, on one hand, set a threshold between what can be done and what cannot, and, on the 
other hand, allow the state to calculate those profitable actions that do not surpass those limits 
–the case of monopolies, for example (Foucault, 2016: 26-27).3 As a consequence, freedom 
inside liberalism is not envisioned as a natural and pre-political space that needs to be 
preserved, but as an area constructed and consumed by the proper nation-states (Foucault, 
2016: 72). 
 
Set this, neoliberalism is envisioned as at the same time differentiated and related 
phenomenon to 18th century’s liberalism. First, in a similar way to liberalism, neoliberalism 
also produces a space of liberty needed for the correct functioning of the market and economy. 
However, its particularity is that the state is not the only actor setting it. Now, the production 
of such area of liberty is transferred to the proper individuals due to a reconceptualization of 
the homo oeconomicus from a subject of exchange to a company himself (Foucault, 2016: 228) 
or, as Gary Becker named it, as a “human capital” guided by its own interests. It is true that 
self-interest was also an important part of liberalism, however, inside neoliberal rationality, 
such self-interest is exacerbated and coupled with the objective of markets and nation-states of 
economic growth. Under such a logic, the enterprise model and its proliferation is situated as 
the main motivator of the neoliberal rationality. In this regard, as Wendy Brown indicates, 
every aspect of human life is contextualized in economic terms (Brown, 2016: 79). 
 
3 However, the threshold between what the state can and cannot do is also defined by a historic evolution of the 
previous state reason. For example, the principle of competences needed for a functional and operative economic 
sphere in the 18th century responded to the balance of powers and interests between states set under the 
Westphalian order (Foucault, 2016: 19). In this light, Foucault states a continuity between this acceptance of plural 
states and their interests in Europe and the development of governmental technologies that tried to maximize the 
welfare of the state (Foucault, 2016: 27). 
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Second, a more interesting fact for a characterization of current consensual politics is the 
coupling between politics and economy. Along the 20th century, the borders between politics 
and economics blurred in detriment of the first (Brown, 2016: 78). Moreover, such 
economization was not limited to the state action and nature, but it was extended to the whole 
society in areas such as education, healthcare, working conditions and interpersonal relations. 
Inside this context, both politics, state action and the democratic system started to be conceived 
in the form of a company that needed to be managed according to the objectives of economic 
growth. Together with this, a related phenomenon is the de-politization of the economy, the 
market and their objectives (Zizek, 2015: 110) which entails two key issues.  
 
First, there is the exclusionary nature of neoliberalism. Such nature works under the 
measure of subjects and overall actions under a logic of economic profitability that excludes 
those not able to participate in the maximization of economic benefits. This aspect has been 
developed by the sociologist Saskia Sassen as a logic of expulsion that localizes the extractive 
character of the market and current economic interactions that could end up in the moment 
when those subjects or companies are not able to provide economic benefits anymore (Sassen, 
2014: 10). In a similar guise but with an emphasis on the subaltern groups, Boaventura Sousa 
Santos has stressed that the promotion of economic interests through the trivialization of 
democratic processes had adverse consequences over the distribution and condition of civic 
society (Santos, 2012: 84). Here, Santos recognizes a threefold polarization between those able 
to enjoy all the set of political, economic and social rights (intimate civic society), those with 
a variable degree of access to such rights and with a moderate danger of falling into a permanent 
precarious and exclusionary situation (strange civic society); and those completely excluded 
from any kind of right or social provision (uncivil civic society) (Santos, 2012: 88-89). 
 
Second, such exclusionary character of neoliberalism is not a definitive and static feature. 
In this regard, Foucault localizes the deep entanglement between the welfare state and 
neoliberal rationality. Nevertheless, this separation is not a definitive one. Concerning this, 
Foucault claims that the role of social services such as the negative income tax is to allow that 
any “player” inside the “economic game” could, in the future, participate again when the 
market mechanisms demand it, but also to be disposable when crises force workers to live again 
in a state of necessity (Foucault, 2016: 207; 212-213). 
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3. CONSENSUAL POLITICS AND POST-POLITICS 
Having set some of the main features of neoliberalism and start to sketch some of the 
aspects of consensual politics it is time now to deepen into the specific character of these last 
ones. To do so, the article will focus on the works of Jacques Ranciére and Slavoj Zizek in 
which a vision of democracy in the light of neoliberal consensual politics. In order to start such 
characterization, it is necessary to briefly explain the relation between democracy and these 
kind of consensual politics and how they affect democratic form of government.  
 
According to Ranciére, there is a paradox in the intrinsic structure of democracy. Such 
paradox is defined, on the one hand, by the proper form of democratic government represented 
by the “good” policies implemented for the sake of reducing the excesses of political activity 
threats (Rancière, 2010: 47). However, on the other hand, the problem is that this political 
excess embodied in the political category of the demos as a form of life that constantly 
challenges and undermines political authority. (Rancière, 2010: 47) 
 
From this standpoint, the democratic paradox is characterized by this agonistic conflict 
between democracy as a form of government and democracy as self-government. Nevertheless, 
Rancière does not negatively describe this contradiction localized in the heart of the democratic 
system. Moreover, he understands that such contradiction is the intrinsic feature of democracy 
that allows the appearance of a rather more paradoxical category: politics (Rancière, 2010: 50). 
In other words, democracy is defined by this paradoxical condition that allows the appearance 
and resolution of constant political struggle.  
 
But why are politics also paradoxical in nature? The answer to this question Rancière 
states that democracy is based on an additional basis not present in other forms of government 
(Rancière, 2010: 51). That additional feature the government is precisely the qualification of 
those not qualified to rule related to the proper etymology and definition of democracy –the 
government of the demos, the ability to rule of those unqualified to do so. On this basis, the 
demos functions as “the inner difference that both legitimizes and de-legitimizes state 
institutions and practices of ruling” (Rancière, 2010: 54). In this light, it is possible to grasp 
that politics in democracy is inherently “dissensual” in nature, an aspect that opens the space 
of politics to the appearance of otherness. As Jacques Rancière puts it, “democracy is this 
principle of otherness” (Rancière, 2010: 51). 
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These days neoliberal governance has brought a number of issues to this understanding 
of democracy, which Rancière interprets in a rather positive way. For him, as Slavoj Zizek 
indicates, we have arrived to a period beyond the political government of democracy which 
may be called the “post-political” moment. The post-political is characterized by two aspects 
already sketched by Foucault and later developed by Brown: the managerial conception of 
politics and the reach of strategic agreement or consensus (Zizek, 2015: 30). For Zizek, post-
politics appears as the solution for the antagonistic ideological struggles based on the 
prescriptions of a group of expertise that reach a more or less acceptable consensus without 
questioning the comprehensive capitalist global relations. In this regard, governmental action 
adopts a pragmatic stance over every societal conflict in which these problems are “managed” 
according to a set of “good practices” that delimit the range of state actions (Zizek, 2015: 32). 
But which is the model that functions as the benchmark of state actions? It is precisely the form 
of the company, a model that is intrinsically de-politized and emptied of any ideological 
content, because, for neoliberalism, the market and the economy are not a space of politics 
(Zizek, 2015: 110). However, such entanglement does not eliminate the importance and 
sovereignty of national governments or international organizations but provides a new 
understanding of the state and its institutions from a managerial and economic standpoint 
(Brown, 2016: 165).4 
 
The negative consequences of such form of government are multiple. Among them, there 
is the perpetuation, with the benevolence of the state and market economy, of precarity not 
only in the case of traditional workers, but also of misrecognized work such as care and 
voluntary work, mostly performed by women; or migrants whose situation as “denizens” 
(Standing, 2016) does not allow them to enjoy their basic human rights. Here, such workers 
are trapped inside temporary work contracts, low salaries and constant violation of human 
rights for the sake of economic profitability on the part of companies; and politics of austerity 
that privatized basic social provisions in the one of the State. This has been named by Philippe 
van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght as the “unemployment/employment trap”, a situation in 
which workers are trapped between such low-standard works and means-tested and badly 
remunerated social provisions (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). 
 
4 Indeed, as both Foucault and Brown indicate, contrary to classical liberalism, neoliberal policies cannot be 
sustained without the aid of the state and a constant intervention to maintain it (Brown, 2016: 79-80). 
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Second, the post-political managerial conception of society also has huge implications 
for some of the basic institutional pillars of democracy in areas such as education and 
healthcare. As an example, Wendy Brown stresses how the vision of the student as “human 
capital” has become dominant inside American universities (Brown, 2016: 235-278). Such 
conception envisions the student as a subject of self-investment that could be seized in 
economic terms with the objective of being an optimal worker inside the labour market, a 
market oriented vision of educational institutions. 
 
Concerning this, it is possible to grasp a convergence between Rancière’s ideas on 
democracy; and the studies on neoliberalism pursued by Foucault. While Rancière and Zizek 
stress how democracy is threatened by the appearance of the post-political moment featured by 
the managerial conception of the state and politics, Foucault addresses the displacements and 
shifts inside the governmental reasons from liberalism to neoliberalism. Such shift, according 
to the French philosopher, is understood as a deep entanglement between the state and the 
market economy in which the former and its actions is envisioned according to the logic of the 
second. Indeed, contrary to the classical liberal separation between the market and the state, 
neoliberalism puts the state as the formalizer and guarantor of the formal aspects of the market 
from which the economy can function correctly (Foucault, 2016: 137).  
 
Having set this contextualization of neoliberalism and how it relates to democracy as a 
form of government, it is time to refer to the other side of the democratic paradox explained by 
Rancière. How would it be possible to resist to disappearance of the political inside democratic 
countries due to the managerial and consensual character of the post-political moment? In order 
to answer such questions, this article will address how a Universal Basic Income (UBI) could 
provide a successful solution to these problems and what are the main obstacles for 
implementing such a policy. 
 
 
4. UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS, OBSTACLES AND 
CHALLENGES 
Since the 1970s and especially in the beginning of the 21st century, Universal Basic 
Income (UBI) proposal has gained increasing attention at political, economic, and public levels 
(Widerquist, 2017). More concretely, populist parties such as Podemos in Spain (Navas, 2014) 
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and Five Star Movement in Italy (Hopkin, 2020: 233) have incorporated material redistributive 
schemes quite similar to the most orthodox UBI proposal in their political programmes. 
Nevertheless, an aspect worth considering is the polyhedric and heterogeneous character of the 
UBI inside the diverse positions of the political spectrum. Regarding this, as Juan Ramón Rallo 
illustrates, UBI can be incorporated in the majority of both conservative and progressive 
political parties (Rallo, 2020). As a consequence, UBI can be envisioned as a double-edged 
economic, political and social policy as it can be supported by both progressive –case of 
Podemos, for example– or conservative parties –for example, in 2021, under a conservative 
government, Germany has launched a UBI pilot project lasting for 3 years.5 But, what does 
UBI exactly propose, especially for political and democratic participation? Which would be 
the obstacles for its implementation? And, finally, which are the intrinsic issues coming from 
the proposal itself? In order to answer such questions, this chapter will deepen into the 
republican case for UBI and analyze which are the procedural difficulties and medium and 
long-term problems raised by this policy. 
 
 
a) UBI and citizenship: the republican standpoint on Universal Basic Income 
 
Various scholars, especially from the republican and socialist environments, have 
stressed the leading benefits for implementing a UBI in democratic countries. First, UBI would 
suppose an increase of the material freedom of individuals in order to regain republican 
freedom. Such freedom is characterized by the avoidance of situations of domination from 
groups and states based on a material independence that would let individuals self-govern 
themselves; and be able to participate on equal basis with other citizens in the public political 
affairs (Raventós, 2007: 202). In this light, the republican case for UBI is not only attached to 
a selfish concept of society and human beings, but to a participatory and collective dimension 
in which equal citizens could participate in the democratic process. From this, republican UBI 
advocates give a significant importance to the emancipatory struggles of social and collective 
groups such as women and trade unions.  
However, it is necessary to recall that such social commitment is a result of the individual 
material security provided by the UBI, something that could function as a double-edge tool. 
 
5 The exact information on the project can be found in Basic Income Pilot Project. (2021). Pilotprojekt 
Grundeinkommen. Retrieved 12 June 2021, from https://www.pilotprojekt-grundeinkommen.de/english 
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On one hand, UBI works as a backstop for the divergent forms of domination, mainly the ones 
of dominium –situation of domination of one individual or group over other individual 
(Raventós, 2007: 64)– and imperium –situation of domination of the state over individuals 
(Rallo, 2020: 147). UBI thus relates to a private interest of being free of any sort of interference 
and arbitrariness from other agents. But how does this republican justification distance itself 
from liberal proponents? For republicans, individual material independence was a conditio sine 
qua non for the acquisition of a certain moral character indispensable for the social and political 
life: virtuosity. For republicanism, virtue is a psychological moral feature that complements 
individual self-government due to material independence and the possibility of attending public 
matters (Raventós, 2007: 65-66).  
 
On the other hand, as Alex Gourevitch has indicated, the claim on the social 
emancipatory aspect of UBI needs to be seized with caution. Putting the example of the 
consequences that the implementation of the UBI would have in the workplace, he states that 
the UBI could perfectly undermine the power of trade unions –and, by extension, of class 
power– in favor of a more individual treatment of labor issues (Gourevitch, 2016: 23-25). 
Furthermore, as also Michel Foucault recognized in the case of negative income tax (Foucault, 
2016: 210), it is possible that UBI could coexist with severe economic and social inequalities 
as it does not challenge the background causes of them such as the “background structure of 
labor and property law” (Gourevitch, 2016: 23).6 
 
Nevertheless, such argument does not confront the real dimension and conception of the 
UBI. As Raventós argues, UBI is not a sort of miraculous policy that would palliate all social 
and economic inequalities inside a society or at global level (Raventós, 2021: 165). Contrary 
to a right-libertarian vision, UBI cannot be conceived as a substitute of the whole frame of the 
welfare state for the sake of decreasing the bureaucratic volume of it (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght, 2017: 197). Thus, a sustainable UBI project needs to be conceived as a 
complement for the already existing health, education and juridical provisions of the state and 
only work as a substitute of those means-tested benefits.  
 
6 However, as authors such as Daniel Raventós have stressed, this does not mean that a proposal such as UBI 
would not aid to challenge a number of relevant inequalities inside capitalist system and improve the situation of 
vast segments of people. For example, in the case of labor force, a UBI would significantly improve the welfare 
and the collective and individual bargaining powers of workers during medium and long-term strikes (Raventós, 
2021: 123-124).  
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Furthermore, Gourevitch’s and Foucault’s arguments also need to face the real 
improvement of the quality of life that a UBI would provide to large segments of the 
population. In this regard, the argument that UBI could work as a barrier for collective 
vindication not only in the labor sector, but also in those areas were inequalities and situations 
of domination happen; does not have to annul the individual emancipatory character of the 
UBI. Indeed, as Raventós indicates, UBI could work as a collective safety net when labor 
strikes are unavoidable because of deplorable working conditions or the violation of workers’ 
rights (Raventós, 2021: 123-124). Thus, UBI could work as a first step towards a 
reconceptualization of collective social struggle and the strategies to solve them. 
 
 
b) Obstacles, solutions and challenges to the implementation of UBI 
 
But, which would be the political and social consequences of implementing the UBI in 
our democratic countries? Which would be the main obstacles in this process?  
Concerning the more political dimension of these questions, Jurgen de Wispelaere has 
pointed out that the use of the UBI in the political arena has acquired a strategic character 
typical of the democratic post-political moment. Approaching this issue from a Marxist 
perspective, Ana Dinerstein and Harry Pitts have stressed the dangers of a political consensus 
around the UBI.  
 
Inside the political parties’ area, de Wispelaere has pointed out that UBI would face 
important obstacles in its process of implementation due to parties’ strategic and instrumental 
use of the policy (De Wispelaere, 2016). A UBI proposal can gain a “cheap” political support 
that limits its process of implementation to the early stages. Furthermore, those political parties 
persistently supporting the policy –for example, green parties– do not enjoy yet the needed 
political and social support to push it through the various processes until its implementation. 
In addition, pushing the UBI forward as a potential policy may produce “counterproductive” 
consequences. In this light, the fact that one party endorses the implementation of the UBI may 
prevent others with divergent ideologies, despite possibly agreeing (De Wispelaere, 2016: 
134). In this regard, a second problem is the persistent political division inside the UBI debate. 
This aspect shows that UBI still needs to tackle a problem of “persistent political division” on 
its more detailed features (De Wispelaere, 2016: 135-137). 
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Regarding this, the consensus that the UBI may deliver at a basic level may be overturned 
when the focus is put in more concrete and controversial aspects. Furthermore, deepening in 
UBI politics demonstrates that the concept of consensus can be analyzed attending to different 
benchmarks. Two of them have already being explained: the neoliberal consensus and the 
political parties’ consensus, which, overall, have been framed in negative terms.  
 
However, an additional sense of consensus has been elaborated attending to a rights 
perspective (De Wispelaere & Morales, 2016; Lenczewska & Schwartz, 2020 ). From this 
perspective, there has been an effort to apply the Rawlsian concept of overlapping consensus 
to the UBI case (Lenczewska & Schwartz, 2020). Briefly, such a concept tries to conform a 
social consensus on key political, social and value matters despite the divergent and plural 
moral views of citizens (Lenczewska & Schwartz, 2020: 15). From this agreement, UBI could 
be introduced in the political debate without comprising the foundational ideological 
components of political parties and social movements. In this sense, such a conception of 
consensus can be interpreted in a weak sense, as the policy is endorsed not attending to the 
specific ideological plans and standpoints, but to the more general normative provisions of it 
(Lenczweska & Schwartz, 2020: 17), something that would avoid the issues de Wispelaere 
indicated.  
 
Indeed, such a vision on consensus has strong ties with the mentioned vision of UBI as a 
right. According to de Wispelaere, UBI can be conceived beyond a mere policy in order to gain 
a rights status. Such status will not be reached attending to moral provisions because of the 
plural moral conceptions social individuals. To do this, de Wispelaere claims, it should be 
added that UBI is not a moral end in itself. On the contrary, UBI, as other social provisions, 
needs to be understood as mean for achieving “an adequate standard of living” (De Wispelaere 
& Morales, 2016: 926). In other words, there are multiple ways to achieve such minimum 
standard which do not imply implementing a UBI. In this sense, appealing to a moral basis on 
a right to UBI does not offer a sufficient ground for implementing it, because, empirically, 
other combinations of social service such as work guarantee or minimum income could achieve 
the same effects (De Wispelaere & Morales, 2016: 927-928).  
An explored option has been to ground the UBI rights claim in its legal superiority over 
other means-tested policies and social provisions. Briefly, such a position indicates that the 
UBI would have more positive effects over multiple social domains than other social policies. 
Material freedom, citizenship and democracy: the case for Universal Basic 
Income in post-political societies 
 141 
In other words, a comparative approach with other social provisions outside a means-ends 
frame could demonstrate the empirical superiority over other policies (De Wispelaere & 
Morales, 2016: 931). 
 
From a Marxist perspective, UBI proposal has been approached by Ana Dinerstein and 
Harry Pitts attending to two aspects. On the one hand, they focus on the Marxist social 
reproduction concept, which attends to the reproductive effects of labor beyond this concrete 
sphere (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2018: 472). Through it, the authors try to expand the Marxist 
approach beyond social and economic conditions to other realities in which oppressive 
relations are present. On the other hand, the two scholars also support their argumentation 
attending to the divergent social forms that are result of the capitalist mode of production 
(Dinerstein & Pitts, 2018: 473). From this, social forms such as the state, money or 
commodities are historically determined realities that emerge from capitalist society. 
 
Attending to these two concepts, Dinerstein and Pitts argue that UBI would represent a 
continuation of the already oppressive reality of capitalist society at economic, social, and 
political levels (Dinerstein and Pitts, 2018: 473).7 
 
More concretely, this Marxist standpoint stresses that the UBI will perpetuate, mainly, 
two social forms: money and the state. Regarding money, UBI will not represent a step towards 
a “post-capitalist society”. The problem with capitalist society and the possible implementation 
of UBI is not the work itself, which could represent an individual and social component of 
recognition (Angella, 2016); but the reproduction of historical social struggles and oppression. 
Moreover, with the aid of state institutions, such social struggles have transformed the 
recognitive and ethical character work to a continuous social, economic, and existential 
struggle for workers and non-workers (Santos, 2012: 82). 
In this sense, neither money nor the state are socially “neutral” forces. They are 
representative of concrete “capitalist social relations” (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2018: 477). 
Moreover, money needs to be envisioned beyond a mere mean of exchange between two or 
 
7 Here it is also possible to grasp the reminiscences of such approach in the Foucauldian views on neoliberalism. 
For them, the UBI and other redistributive scheme such as the negative income tax would perpetuate the structural 
causes and sources of oppression present nationally and globally. Nevertheless, the Marxist perspective delivered 
by Dinerstein and Pitts represent a more straight example of the consequences that the implementation of the UBI 
would have. For the purpose of this research, the consequences for the political and democracy in general will 
represent the most interesting ones. 
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more agents. In this light, money is a mean of subjection of workers to wage labor. As 
Dinerstein and Pitts argue, “(…) the wage is not a reward for expended labor but a payment to 
keep workers in the condition that they can and must labor” (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2018: 476).  
 
Thus, what UBI may do is to shift the origin of this subjection from the enterprises and 
companies to the state, which would be the main supplier of income for citizens. Concerning 
this, there is another convergence between Foucauldian studies and the Marxist ones, the one 
showing the managerial and entrepreneurial nature of state in neoliberalism. In this sense, the 
state becomes a company that provides income to national citizens in the same way as big 
companies did in the past, while, at the same time, they maintain the structures of domination 
present in them. 
 
Additionally, another point of coincidence can be found in the different class and political 
struggles traditionally addressed inside Marxist studies and the claims made by Jacques 
Rancière and Slavoj Zizek on post-political societies. Concerning this, if we stick to the 
paradoxical character of politics inside democracy, there are several reasons for emphasizing a 
number of negative outcomes coming from the implementation of the UBI. It is true that, as it 
has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, UBI would aid to increase citizens’ 
participation in the political and public sphere by providing a material income that would 
permit them to cultivate civic virtue. Nevertheless, the current UBI models and proposals 
deliver divergent problems. First, despite being conceive as a universally applicable policy, 
UBI has the danger of becoming a deeply reactionary and exclusionary policy against non-
national subjects such as immigrants and stateless people (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2016: 479). 
Although main scholars on UBI have tried to show that the implementation of the policy  will 
not result in mass migration from poor to richer countries (Boso & Vancea, 2012; Van Parijs 
& Vanderborght, 2017), the instrumentalization of the proposal by divergent political parties 
and movements has hindered the foundational aims of the proposal. Moreover, together with 
this “strategic” use of the UBI described before, to this day the reality is that UBI is still 
conceived as a policy for nation-states. With this, UBI could work as a potential supporter of 
nationalistic and reactionary attitudes. From this, if the UBI is implemented at a national level, 
it runs the danger of annulling its inherent emancipatory character in order to become a tool for 
authoritarian regimes (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2017: 479). 
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However, as it has been analyzed throughout this chapter, UBI can be an important 
dissensus tool against social, and individual constraints coming not only from the managerial 
behavior of the state, but also from the more abstract relations of power resulting from 
neoliberal political rationality. But, set this twofold character of UBI, it is possible to argue that 
it has an intrinsic paradoxical nature coming from its theoretical conceptualization and its 
pragmatic treatment. Furthermore, what we have here is also the bigger paradox of democracy 
and politics, the paradox between the formalization of democratic institutions and policies and 
the democratic form of life that constantly challenges them. In this sense, the UBI runs the 
constant danger of being a policy instrumentalized for maintaining a social and political 
consensus that invalidates any kind of critical voice for the sake of good management of the 
state under the economic rationality. In fact, as David Harvey has detected, there is a deep 
entanglement between neoliberalism and recent neoconservative attitudes, something that may 
help to explain the use of the UBI in recent populist movements in Europe and US (Harvey, 
2007: 95). On the other hand, UBI also presents a proper emancipatory character that suits 
perfectly with the democratic form of life expressed by Rancière. More concretely, UBI would 
represent a sort of instrumental tool for enforcing the vindications not only at subjective level, 
but also at the collective one. Such an argument is strongly present in the republican case for 
UBI and in those advocates of a transition to a post-work society (Srnicek & Williams, 2017).  
 
It is thus possible to conclude that UBI can be envisioned together with democratic 
politics. However, in the same way as Rancière states on the evaluation of democratic politics, 
this paradoxical aspect of UBI does not imply a negative conception of it. On the contrary, UBI 
should be envisioned as a policy sustaining the constant confrontation with the otherness not 
only coming from outside in the form of immigrants or denizens; but also from within the limits 
of nation-states in the case of precarious workers or the care work done generally by women. 
In this sense, a sustainable and all-encompassing version of the UBI should maximize this 
aspect inside the political arena; and not the exclusionary and nationalistic one conceived by 
populist parties; or the strategic one for electoral yields.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION. BUILDING CONSENSUS THROUGH DISSENSUS: THE RESISTANCE 
POWER OF UBI 
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This article has evaluated the role that UBI would play inside democratic nation-states 
attending to the definition and characterization of democracy offered by Jacques Rancière. The 
French philosopher understands democracy as a constant dissensual struggle between 
democracy as a formal and institutional form of government; and as a form of life that always 
extends and changes the limits of the political. Despite the positive connotation of such 
conception of democracy based on continuous configuration of the political arena and 
discussion, the article has pointed out that current consensual post-political moment has eroded 
this basis of democracy as political participation of citizens. Understood as a managerial 
governance, the state and its institutional manifestations have incorporated a political 
rationality focused on the economic growth and profit. Furthermore, such “economization” has 
also extended to other areas of life such as interpersonal relations, education, or the proper area 
of politics.  
 
This research has tried to indicate how could the UBI contribute to the political and 
participatory aspect of democracy. Conceived in republican terms, it has been stated that UBI 
could be seized as a potential mean for achieving material independence thus allowing citizens 
to attend their political duties in the public sphere. However, this solution offered by UBI also 
poses a few obstacles stemming from the intrinsic contradictions of the policy and the context 
on which it would be implemented in.  
 
The conclusion has been that, indeed, the paradox of democratic politics is strongly 
related to the both instrumental and emancipatory character of UBI. On one hand, it is evident 
that UBI is able to provide a sort of material safety net for the most precarious segments of 
society. This is why it is possible to give a pragmatic reading on UBI, one that stresses its 
intrinsic emancipatory and democratic features. Such a view will correspond to the establishing 
of an economic rights that will counter the exclusionary effects of global neoliberalism (Santos, 
2012: 140).  
 
On the other hand, the political instrumentalization of UBI provides some skepticism on 
the possibilities of implementing a sustainable and comprehensive version of it and some of its 
emancipatory features. In this sense, UBI needs to face the constant struggle between political 
parties in democratic nation-states and the difficulty to reach a viable version of UBI. In 
addition to this, some Marxist scholars have pointed out that UBI is unable to provide an 
alternative status quo beyond the current capitalist mode of production. Such a reading has also 
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been present in the Foucaldian inquiries on neoliberalism and the role of social policies, in 
which the later, rather than tackling the causes of inequality and precarity, try to palliate the 
effects of them resulting in the perpetuation of an unjust society. Indeed, they understand that 
UBI could be envisioned as a rather conservative and reactionary tool.  
 
Nevertheless, which are the future prospects of a possible implementation of a UBI? An 
answer that has been briefly sketched in this article has been the possibility of understanding 
UBI as a human right. Despite the intrinsic difficulties for that foundation from a moral 
standpoint, the fact is that such a framework could provide a fruitful perspective on how to 
understand the future of the UBI. Such an understanding is deeply related to the republican 
view on UBI, a vision that is not only concerned about the negative duties and rights of 
individuals; but also, in its positive ones related to the political and civic participation. 
Therefore, UBI can be incorporated inside the democratic form of life described by Rancière 
that tries to go beyond the neoliberal managerial state, the erosion of the political arena and the 
extension of the area of politics beyond the limits of the nation-states. 
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